

PEACE OPERATIONS: A MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK?

**A MONOGRAPH
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Armor**



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
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
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ABSTRACT

Peace Operations: A Mission Essential Task? by MAJ Gregory D. Reilly, USA,
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The number of peace operations US Army forces engage in will likely increase, rather than decrease in the future. Peace operations are nothing new to the military. What is new, however, is the number, pace, scope and complexity of these operations. There is growing concern that the current operations tempo of the US Army is eroding the combat readiness of forces to fight wartime contingencies. On the other hand, as units focus training on wartime contingencies, how prepared are they to conduct peace operations?

This monograph explores the tasks associated with conducting peace operations to determine if infantry forces should include peace operations in the development of their mission essential task list. An historical overview of three recent peace operations (Restore Hope, Provide Comfort, and Uphold Democracy) enabled a classification of tasks that were performed during these operations. The tasks conducted during these operations were compared to tasks infantry units conduct during combat operations to determine the extent they deviated. The analysis concluded that tasks associated with conducting peace operations were predominately tactical tasks. The findings of this monograph suggest that infantry forces should not include peace operations in the development of their mission essential task list. Infantry units that are well disciplined, trained, and led have the flexibility to rapidly transition to peace operations.

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INTRODUCTION

Under current US national strategy of engagement and enlargement, we have entered an age where virtually every regional or local crisis on the globe is considered a potential occasion for US military intervention.¹

Background

As the 21st Century nears there is evidence that suggests that the United States Army will be performing more, not fewer peace operations. This prediction is the result of recent patterns and events that have occurred since the ending of the Cold War.² The collapse of the Soviet Union brought optimism that promised reduced military forces and smaller defense budgets. What has actually transpired, however, is an increase in military intervention in peace operations.

The United States Army has experienced several changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War. The Army recently completed a post Cold War down-sizing reducing the size of the Army from eighteen active Army divisions to just ten, from 1989 to 1995.³ Along with the force structure reduction, a personnel draw-down shrank the Army from 781,000 soldiers to just 495,000. The reduction in US Army forces that occurred was thought appropriate in the light of the reduced Soviet conventional threat. Since the Army drawdown period, however, there has been an increase in deployments to support peace operations. As of June 1996, the United Nations (UN) approved a total of 41 peace-keeping operations.⁴ Fifteen of these peace operations were established in the forty years between 1948 and 1988. The remaining 26 peace operations occurred since 1989.⁵

As the number of peacekeeping missions increased, so too have the costs and contributions of military forces. In 1988 the total force contribution to UN missions was 11,121 with an annual budget of 230 million dollars. In 1994 the force contribution to UN missions was increased to 77,783 with an annual cost of 3.6 billion dollars.⁶ This increase in UN approved peace operations is attributed to increased political, economic and military instability in many regions of the world. Many conflicts that normally would have been kept at bay by the rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War erupted during this period. Long-standing ethnic, cultural and religious disputes are flaring up to the point where States are failing. Failed States are characterized by loss of government control, anarchy, power struggles and civil strife. As a result, US Army forces played a role in twice as many peace operations after 1989 than it did during the 40 years prior.⁷ The most notable peace operations that the US contributed to between 1990 and 1998 included deployments to: the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia), Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and Kuwait.⁸ Peace operations are not new, what is new, however, is the number, pace, scope and complexity of these operations.⁹

Army leaders have recently expressed concern that the combination of decreasing federal defense budgets, a reduction of 39% since 1989, coupled with increasing operations tempo (associated with non-mission essential requirements) is having an adverse effect on Army combat readiness.¹⁰ Army leaders, recognize that there are readiness trade-offs associated with conducting peace operations, but also recognize that only soldiers can perform many of the peace missions they are assigned.¹¹ As the number, scope and complexity of peace operations has increased, arguments have surfaced questioning the feasibility of US military forces to endure the tempo of peace operations

deployments. There are those who argue that military forces are well suited and trained to conduct peace operations and conclude that many of the tasks associated with conducting war-time missions are directly related to conducting peace operations.¹² This monograph is aimed at determining the extent US infantry forces are trained and prepared to execute tasks associated with conducting peace operations.

There is always a thread of caution and apprehension attached to the notion of US Army soldiers conducting peace operations. The apprehension and concern of military leaders to engage in Peace Operations was recently reinforced during events that occurred in October 1993 in Mogadishu.¹³ American soldiers, operating under the auspices of a United Nations mission to provide humanitarian assistance to thousands of displaced people on the brink of disaster in Somalia, found themselves in a mission apprehending warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid. The mission to acquire and apprehend the warlord and his hostile followers resulted in a fierce battle against segments of the populace of central Mogadishu. What initially started as a good will, humanitarian relief operation, evolved and escalated into operations outside of UN control. The scope and nature of the humanitarian mission changed when incidents between US forces and clans under the control of Aidid increased. A clear signal of increased tensions occurred on 5 June 1993, when 25 Pakistani soldiers were ruthlessly attacked and killed by gunman under Aidid while distributing food to some of the neediest people in Mogadishu.¹⁴ The US, compelled to react, responded by apprehending the aids of Aidid and other faction members responsible for this attack. On 13 October 1993, US Army Rangers and Special Forces conducted a raid to capture aids of Aidid. The operation was confronted with

heavy resistance, which resulted in 75 American soldiers wounded, and 18 that lost their lives.¹⁵

There are pragmatic concerns associated with assigning Army combatant units the mission of conducting Peace Operations. When conducting peace operations military commanders are challenged to find solutions to problems that are distinctly unique to the situation. Often, the solution does not focus on the use of force. Peace operations are usually international in scope and conducted under the auspices of UN Resolutions, Mandates and Charters. Peace operations are usually joint or combined in nature and may contain all three levels of war, tactical, operational and strategic. Commanders conducting peace operations are faced with the difficulty of producing workable strategies and courses of action aimed at accomplishing non-traditional objectives, such as political stability, nation building, reduced human suffering, peace keeping and enforcement.¹⁶ This problem is echoed by an Army colonel recalling his staff officer duties in Operation Uphold Democracy: “The single hardest thing I have had to do in my military experience was to come up with an OOTW campaign plan.”¹⁷

United States military and political leaders are apprehensive about conducting peace operations for many reasons. Peace operations are usually complex, incur the risk of expanding in scope, and are often prolonged beyond the initial planning directives.¹⁸ What may begin as a humanitarian relief operation may easily evolve into nation building or peace enforcement. The mission of protecting vulnerable groups, humanitarian supplies, non-government agencies, and force protection can easily escalate into an armed conflict between the US Army and hostile factions, groups, clans or gangs.

The increase in US Army deployments in peace operations during the last six years is primarily the result of political instability in many parts of the world.¹⁹ Political, military and civil conflicts currently exist in the former Yugoslavia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Cambodia, Iraq and Algiers, to name just a few. The by-product of regional military conflict and civil strife that gains the attention of United States Political leaders is often the proliferation of hostilities to neighboring states and the widespread human suffering that results. The United States, often acting under the auspices of UN or NATO authority, selectively engages in peace operations once it deems that US National interests is at stake. The United States, in its National Military Strategy identifies the "pursuit of humanitarian interests" as the third category of US interests.²⁰ During the last six years the US has intervened on several occasions militarily when a humanitarian emergency of great proportion exists. A "humanitarian emergency" is defined as a situation where a human group is made vulnerable immediately or within a short time to a possible mortal threat.²¹ Humanitarian emergencies create conditions that, in the words of National Military Strategy: "compel our nation to act because our values demand US involvement."²² As a result, the United States Army was repeatedly deployed to conduct peace operations for humanitarian reasons in: Northern Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Each of these operations was unique, posing new and distinct challenges in areas of logistics, force protection, command and control, organization, and civil-military relations.

It is understood that there are problems associated with conducting peace operations with an Army that is structured, equipped and trained primarily to fight and win the nations wars.²³ One of the problems is directly related to Army training doctrine.

Army Field Manual 25-100, *Training the Force* provides the guidelines on how the Army plans, executes and assesses training at all levels.²⁴ Army training is planned and conducted by units to achieve proficiency on mission essential tasks. The Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) of Army units is derived from its wartime mission and external directives.²⁵ The unit's "Battle Tasks" are derived directly from its METL and it is from this list that unit training is focused.²⁶ The training focus is on the unit's wartime mission. Training is "performance oriented" and intended to be challenging, realistic and when possible emulate the conditions of combat.²⁷ As the Army continues to conduct peace operations, and shifts focus away from its wartime missions, the question that arises is: are army units trained to perform tasks that are associated with peace operations? This question raises concerns about the suitability of combat units to conduct peace operations while training is completely focused on the wartime mission.

The Research Question

If it is true that peace operations may increase in frequency in the future, perhaps there is room to consider altering training doctrine associated with conducting these operations? The foremost task of the military is to fight and win the Nation's wars and current training doctrine focuses on this reality.²⁸ However, as deployments in support of peace operations continue to increase, should peace operations be considered part of a unit's Mission Essential Task Lists (METL)? **More specifically, should light infantry forces include peace operations in the development of their mission essential task list?**

The answer to this question is important and of interest for several reasons. The mission to fight and win the nation's wars remains the keystone imperative of the United States Army.²⁹ There are those who argue that as budgets decrease, increased operations tempo conducting peace operations impairs the combat readiness of the Army.³⁰ Army infantry units are disciplined, flexible and resilient, however, are they capable of sustaining the current tempo of operations while keeping the edge on combat readiness? Prior to most peace operations there are unique challenges, which are specific to peace operations. Prior to deployment a hasty transition is usually required to get units ready to go. Tasks may include: unique force tailoring, training on peace keeping/peace enforcement tasks, support of diplomacy, interface with non government and private organizations, cease fire surveillance, and enhancing soldier's cultural awareness of the region where operations are conducted.³¹ Once a unit is alerted that they are deploying to conduct peace operations, training focus shifts away from combat readiness. The posture of the unit is redirected and the principles guiding these operations change. Furthermore, each deployment is different, posing new challenges depending on the political, economic and military environment of the region in which the unit is deployed.

In preparing for the challenges of peace operations a unit may shift focus away from wartime related training and orient on the specific requirements of the peace operation ahead. As Army Field Manual 23-100, *Peace Operations*, states: "In peace operations, settlement, not victory is the measure of success. The concept of traditional military victory or defeat is inappropriate in peace operations."³² In peace operations battle lines are seldom drawn, the battlefield is not linear, and the threat may not exist. In peace operations there is usually the presence of noncombatants within the area of

operations.³³ This was true prior to the deployment of the 3rd Battalion 325th Airborne Combat Team to Northern Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort), 1st Armored Division's deployment into Bosnia, and the 10th Infantry Division's deployment into Haiti (Uphold Democracy).

Peace operations are complex, often requiring special training for leaders and soldiers to operate in an environment that may be politically unstable. US Forces may find authorities within a country are difficult to negotiate with because they are regional, and have territorial boundaries that overlap. United States Army doctrine on peace operations, FM 23-100, states: "United States forces involved in peace operations may not encounter large, professional armies or even organized groups responding to a chain of command. Instead they may have to deal with loosely organized groups of irregulars, terrorists, or other conflicting segments of a population as predominant forces." Besides Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs), and the media, the force commander conducting peace operations may have to work closely with a variety of political authorities, such as: US Ambassador, Presidential envoy, or a senior UN representative. Given the unique nature of peace operations, should infantry units include tasks associated with these operations as mission essential?

Army units are not encouraged to include peace operations in their go-to-war mission essential task list.³⁴ Instead, it is believed that Army units should remain battle focused and transition, when required, to peace operations training. Army doctrine states that the best way to prepare Army units for peace operations is through mastery of combat related skills.³⁵ It emphasizes that four to six weeks of specialized training is required prior to deployment to prepare units for peace operations.³⁶ But is this enough? Are units

that remain “battle focused” able to quickly transition into peace operations? If the Army, is indeed going to contribute more to peace operations in the future, shouldn’t training emphasis reflect this change? One recently published reference suggests that soldiers are not adequately trained: “notwithstanding the most thorough mission analysis and the best intentions of civilian and military leaders, units and soldiers deployed on peace operations all too often find themselves performing unanticipated tasks for which they have neither been trained nor given specific guidance.”³⁷ This point was also recently echoed by another researcher that states: “virtually every nontraditional operation case study involving combat units is replete with a litany of complaints that the troops were not prepared or trained to perform many of the noncombat tasks assigned to them. Such tasks have included distributing food, manning checkpoints, collecting money for weapons, serving as military police, quelling civil disturbances, picking up garbage, administering to cities and towns, providing a “presence,” reassuring local inhabitants, negotiating with civic leaders, arbitrating between contending factions, rebuilding infrastructure, and escorting VIPs, just to name a few.”³⁸

Significance:

There is mounting evidence that the combat readiness of the US Army has deteriorated during the last five years.³⁹ Evidence suggests that “the conventional combat skills and the warrior ethic that goes with them are being eroded by a combination of downsizing, budget cuts, and widespread commitments to non-combat operations in Bosnia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.”⁴⁰ A concern about the US military’s combat readiness has recently caught the interest of Senator James M. Inhofe, Chairman of the

Senate Armed Services Committee. As a result, he is scheduled to meet with the military's top leaders to determine the readiness posture of US military forces. It is Senator Inhofe's assessment, after touring several military installations, that current military readiness is actually "worse than people say it is."⁴¹ Retired Army Chief of Staff, Gordon R. Sullivan attributes the downward spiral in Army readiness to budget shortfalls over a six year period while experiencing increased operations tempo.⁴² He states that the negative side effects of this trend can be seen in unit observations and performance at the nation's training centers.⁴³

The readiness question facing the Army is not a new phenomenon. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Army has been reduced by 35%, the Army budget has declined 39%, operational deployments and personnel turnover is at an all time high and recruiting goals are not being met. Interestingly, many of these ills were present during the period following the Vietnam War.

The Army made great strides after the Vietnam War in modernizing equipment, doctrine and its training approach. The Army realized it had to change if it was going to fight out-numbered and win a conventional war against the USSR in Europe. The M1 Abrams main battle tank, Apache attack helicopter, Blackhawk helicopter and the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle were developed to defeat this threat. General William DePuy, Max Thurman and Paul Gorman recognized that in the aftermath of the Vietnam war the US Army needed to focus directly on its wartime contingencies and more specifically, how to fight.⁴⁴ What followed between 1973 and 1978 transformed the Army's orientation on wartime readiness. Air-Land Battle Doctrine was developed that changed the Army's orientation from a defensive posture to one of offensive maneuver. The Army published

tasks, conditions and standards for training that spanned from individual soldier requirements to the brigade battle task force. Training emphasis was placed on performance and became what is now called performance-oriented training.⁴⁵ The Army Training and Evaluation Program was established and the national training centers were built. Multiple integrated laser engagement systems (MILES) were developed and used during training to improve the quality and realization of training. The period 1975 to 1990 encompassed an overall transformation that focused primarily on fighting and winning the nations next war.

The innovations and cognitive change in institutional orientation that occurred during this period is directly attributed to the US Army's outstanding performance during the Gulf War.⁴⁶ Success in the Gulf War reflects the high level of leadership competence, wartime focus, soldier training, and unit discipline that existed just after the conclusion of the Cold War. Many argue that since the conclusion of the cold war the US Army has lost its readiness edge in fighting and winning the nation's wars. As of December 1996 the Army was engaged in 27 separate peace operations and experiencing an operations tempo that many suggests detracts the Army from training and focusing on wartime contingencies. Clearly the significance of this idea is apparent. Is the Army losing its readiness edge to fight and win the nation's wars when spread thin conducting peace operations?

The requirement for US Army soldiers to conduct peace operations abroad will not likely go away. The concept of humanitarianism is most fully developed in cultures and jurisprudence of Judeo-Christian nations.⁴⁷ This isn't to say that humanitarianism doesn't exist globally and cross religious, political and geographical borders, but the West

is generally associated with having the industrial capability and ideals that are necessary to supporting and conducting humanitarian relief operations. In addition, it is generally understood that United States is the only nation who has the reach and depth to conduct these laborious and often time-consuming missions. Peace operations usually require activities that go beyond the requirement of establishing buffer zones between opposing forces. More often they also require the distribution of logistics, nation building, medical assistance and life support. Peace operations often include the need for protection against violations of human rights that usually occur in conjunction with military or civil conflict. Peace operations may arise as the result of natural disasters such as disease, famine or flood, but on most occasions they are the result of armed civil or military conflict. This was the case in United States military peace operations recently conducted in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Even more recent is the US Army's participation of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (Uphold Democracy). This operation began as a political stabilization mission and once the political situation was stabilized was transformed into a humanitarian assistance/nation-building operation.

The United States and the international community recognize the importance, if not the legal obligation to conduct peace operations. Humanitarian relief operations, which are encompassed under the major heading of peace operations, have played a larger role in recent US Army deployments than during the Cold War. There are several international instruments that protect the rights of individuals and recognize the rights of civilians to have access to humanitarian assistance that is provided by impartial organizations. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols of 1977 legitimize humanitarian relief operations.⁴⁸ In addition, The United Nations (UN) Charter

specifies that it has the responsibility to promote fundamental human rights.⁴⁹ These international instruments, along with the US National Policy, and Directives, provide the legitimacy to conduct peace operations on a global scale.⁵⁰ Given the international and US position on human suffering and US interest in maintaining peace and stability abroad it seems that the US Army will continue to engage in peace operations well into the 21st Century.⁵¹

If the Army recognizes the demanding and unique requirements of peace operations, to the point where peace operations attains the focus of training, it may be argued that additional force structure is required to perform peace operations while maintaining battle focus and combat readiness. If peace operations continue to consume forces, and absorb the edge of combat readiness, it may be time to consider designating units with the specific mission of conducting these types of operations. The first step in this process may be to determine if there is a significant requirement for training, organization and doctrine. The next step is the measurement of degradation in combat readiness as a result of conducting peace operations. This monograph aims to explore a small part of this complex issue. It focuses on training, and more specifically if peace operations should be recognized as a mission essential task for Army infantry forces.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The purpose of this review is to formulate a hypothesis to the research question: should infantry forces include peace operations in development of their mission essential task list? The review also provides the basis for which criteria are developed for analysis.

The literature review includes a general overview of Army doctrine, peace operations doctrine, light infantry division doctrine, and effects of peace operations on unit readiness.

Army Doctrine:

Probably the most useful definition of doctrine is found in *Leavenworth Paper Number 16*: “doctrine is authoritative fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions.”⁵² The Army’s doctrine on how the United States Army fights wars and Operations Other Than War (OOTW) is Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*.⁵³ Although Army doctrine includes guidelines for fighting wars and OOTW, its primary focus is on how to fight and win the nations wars. Army doctrine is not static, it continues to evolve over time to meet the changing political environment, the threat to US interests, advances in weaponry and to fulfill requirements in national military strategy. As such, current doctrine reflects the need to meet many diverse contingencies, to be prepared, trained and ready to engage in a variety of missions across a range of varying levels of conflict. Army doctrine classifies its activities during peacetime and conflict into peacetime, conflict and war. Within this range of military states there are activities that the Army may be called on conduct. During war, activities may include defend, attack and other large scale operations. During periods of conflict activities may include strikes, raids, peace enforcement, support to insurgency, antiterrorism, and peacekeeping. During periods of peacetime Army activities may include counter-drug, disaster relief, civil support, peace building and nation assistance.⁵⁴ It is important to note that Army doctrine applies to a wide range of possible military activities from domestic civil support to large-scale attack against foreign enemies.

Army doctrine provides a list of fundamental principles that are intended to apply across the full range of military operations. These principles are derived from history and military theory and have stood the test of time, they include: mass, objective, offensive, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity.⁵⁵ Each of these principles are defined and serve as the foundation for planning and executing all military operations. The Army, however, recognizes the unique nature of operations other than war and provides a different list of principles to guide actions when conducting these types of operations. The principles of operations other than war are: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. While the principles of objective, and security remain relative to all operations, OOTW introduces the application of new and distinctly different principles. Probably the most distinguishing difference between principles of war and OOTW is "restraint." Restraint addresses the unique relationship the use of force has in OOTW. In OOTW the use of force may hinder the progress of the operation. Rules of engagement establish the criteria for the use of force and this may change rapidly depending on the situation. The level of restraint imposed on tactics, weaponry and levels of violence are dependent on the political, military and physical environment.

Peace Operations Doctrine

Peace operations are a sub-component of OOTW and encompass three types of activities: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.⁵⁶ The components of support to diplomacy include: peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy. The missions assigned to peace enforcement forces may include: restoration and

maintenance of order and stability, protection of humanitarian assistance, guarantee and denial of movement, enforcement of sanctions, establishment and supervision of protected zones, forcible separation of belligerent parties, and other operations as deemed necessary.⁵⁷ Although humanitarian relief and assistance operations are not categorized under the doctrinal framework of "Peace Operations, they are often conducted in conjunction with peace operations."⁵⁸

The United States reserves the right to conduct peace operations unilaterally or under the auspices of international law. When acting under the latter the United States equips, trains and executes operations primarily under chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter. Peace keeping operations usually fall under the scope of Chapter VI where high levels of consent and strict impartiality are established, thus peace keeping operations are often referred to as Chapter VI operations. Peace enforcement operations usually involve low levels of consent and questionable impartiality. Peace enforcement operations are frequently referred to as PE (peace enforcement) because Chapter VII is so broad it encompasses a wider range of operations than just peace enforcement.⁵⁹

Peace operations are complex and somewhat unorthodox relative to the traditional role of US Army units. As the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* states: "There is no standard peace operations mission...each peace operations is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural and military characteristics."⁶⁰ Army units conducting peace operations may be expected to display an attitude that deviates from the military code of conduct. Soldiers deployed to foreign countries find themselves performing operations requiring them to maintain impartiality between warring factions.

Humanitarian relief operations may also complement peace operations.

Humanitarian relief operations compound the complexity of peace operations. Army doctrine reflects the difference in environment of humanitarian action and has established principles that are distinct from Army operational doctrine. The humanitarian and War Project of the Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University developed a set of eight principles that are currently printed in FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. The principles of humanitarian action are: Relieve Life threatening Suffering, Proportionality to Need, Nonpartisanship, Independence, Accountability, Appropriateness, Contextualization, and Subsidiary of Sovereignty.⁶¹ These principles focus directly on the unique aspect of humanitarian action and are designed as a practitioner's guide.

As stated earlier, the principles of peace operations are objective, unity of effort, security, perseverance, restraint, and legitimacy. The principle of perseverance means being prepared to conduct long and protracted operations.⁶² Peace operations may take years to achieve strategic aims. To illustrate this point, there are currently five United Nations peace operations being conducted worldwide that have lasted at least 20 years (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL).⁶³ The principle of restraint emphasizes the proper and prudent application of military capability. This translates into the disciplined application of force, tactics and rules of engagement. In peace operations emphasis on mediation and negotiations take the place of deadly force as the primary means of achieving mission results. These two principles, restraint and perseverance are the primary differences between wartime operations and peace operations. They are contrary to quick and decisive victory with overwhelming combat power.

The principles of peace operations are specific to the unique nature of peace operations environments. The widely understood principles of mass, maneuver, and economy of force take on new meanings when applied to peace operations. Army leaders planning peace operations consider the impact that the use of force, vigilance and even soldier posture play in obtaining military objectives. Depending on the situation, even measures of force protection can have a negative effect on the peacekeeping operations. LTC Edward Anderson of TF 180 stated that US protective posture in Haiti during operation Uphold Democracy may have prevented the Army from going out and seeing the people and may have hindered the need of gaining the confidence of the population.⁶⁴ Army Field manual 23-100, emphasizes that in conducting peace operations the use of force to attain a short-term tactical success could lead to long-term strategic failure. This manual states that “the use of force may affect other aspects of the operation. In adhering to the principles of peace operations the use of force could heighten tension, polarize public opinion against the operation and participants, foreclose negotiating opportunities, prejudice the perceived impartiality of the peace operation force and escalate the overall level of violence.”⁶⁵

Peace operations doctrine emphasizes integration of resources specifically tailored to the environment where operations are conducted. Private humanitarian organizations play a pivotal role in providing the expertise in distributing emergency supplies, medical aid and life support. Because they are often the first organizations deployed during humanitarian emergencies, they often provide the initial expertise in negotiating with local leaders, authorities, police and other civil organizations. Peace operations also place a higher demand on civil affairs, Special Forces, PSYOPS, military police, interpreters,

engineers, logistics, and liaison. In Mogadishu, during operation Restore Hope, military Police (MP) units were in great demand because of their unique capabilities and training. Military Police are mobile, have firepower and are trained to conduct convoy security, checkpoints, roadblocks and reconnaissance.⁶⁶

As mentioned earlier, units are not encouraged to include peace operations as part of their METL. Instead, forces train on tasks prior to deployment that are aimed at the mission of the particular situation. Table One, below, lists the key subjects to consider when training for peace operations prior to deployments.⁶⁷

Table One: Peace Operations Tasks

Peace Keeping	Peace Operations
The nature of peace operations	Meeting engagement
The establishment of lodgments	Movement to contact
Relief in place	Search and attack
Regional orientations	Air Assault
Establishment of a buffer zone	Enforcing sanctions
Supervision of a truce	Protecting human rights
The monitoring of boundaries	Protecting humanitarian relief
Contributions to maintenance of law and order	Separating factions
Negotiating skills	Disarming belligerents
Mine and Booby-trap training and awareness	Restoring territorial integrity
Assistance in rebuilding infrastructure	Restoring law and order
Check point operations	Demilitarizing forces
Investigating and reporting	Opening secure routes
Information collection	Rules of engagement
Patrolling	Civil military operations
Media interrelationships	Control of multinational units
Staff training	Intelligence dissemination
Demilitarization of forces and geographical areas	NGO operations
Rules of Engagement	Multinational logistics
	PSYOP
	Intercultural communication
	Raids, attack Defense

The list of subjects and tasks associated with peace operations is extensive and diverse. The training list is inclusive of tasks to fit a wide range of possible situations. Units preparing for peace operations would focus primarily on those tasks specific to the situation.

Expertise in understanding the cultural realities of the environment require expertise that often go beyond normal intelligence requirements associated with combat operations. In Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti) Flyers were produced for distribution to the local community and after producing the flyers in French it was discovered that only the Haitian elite's spoke French and the general population spoke Haitian Creole.⁶⁸ It is for reasons such as this that civil-military relations may be the top priority during peace operations.⁶⁹

Light Infantry Division Doctrine:

Light infantry forces are the fundamental fighting organization of the US Army. Infantry forces are organized as teams, squads, sections, platoons, companies, battalions, brigades, regiments and divisions. The infantry division is a large Army organization that trains and fights as a tactical team. Largely self sustaining, it is capable of independent operations."⁷⁰ The infantry division usually operates as part of a Corps, however, it can serve as part of a Joint Task Force, or as an Army force headquarters within a Joint task force. With staff augmentation, it can also serve as the headquarters of a joint task force. The light infantry division is one of the most rapidly and strategically deployable divisions.⁷¹

The infantry division is designed and capable of accomplishing a wide range of missions during both war and OOTW. It is optimal for conducting operations in restricted terrain in limited visibility. The infantry division encompasses multiple designs. The light infantry division serves as the foundation of the Army tactical fighting force. Although rapidly deployable, all light infantry divisions are somewhat limited in tactical mobility and by their austere combat support capability. As such, light infantry divisions are task organized with Corps level logistics units to enhance the sustainment of the deployed division. The mechanized infantry division is composed of a mix of heavy forces that provide high mobility and excellent force projection. The mechanized division's is equipped with the Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. The airborne infantry division is highly mobile and capable of conducting raids, securing lodgments, and deploying into austere environments. Although rapidly deployable to virtually anywhere in the world, the airborne infantry lacks tactical mobility once deployed. The air assault division combines strategic deployability with tactical mobility.⁷² Borne out of the need for deep insertion capability over restricted terrain during the Vietnam War, the air assault division links infantry with heliborne operations within an area of operations.

The primary role of the light infantry division is to fight and win engagements and battles against enemy forces. Infantry soldiers are trained to fight individually and collectively as a squad, platoon, company, battalion and brigade. The light infantry division is capable of conducting combat operations on a scale ranging from total war to operations other than war. Combat operations are characterized as either offensive or defensive. Combat operations that light infantry divisions may conduct to gain the

objectives of battle include: attack, movement to contact, counter-mobility, exploitation, security, deception, counterattack, retrograde, survivability, breakout, defend, mobility and river crossing.⁷³ In addition to operations there are a host of subordinate tactical tasks that further delineate types of combat missions light infantry forces may engage in. A few of the tactical tasks include: attack by fire, block, bypass, canalize, feint, defeat, destroy, guard, recon, and retain.⁷⁴ Light infantry divisions may identify several tactical tasks as mission essential tasks if the task is required to perform their wartime mission. Mission essential tasks are derived from wartime contingency plans, operations orders and other directives that specify the area of operations and nature of the mission a unit will be trained and prepared to conduct during wartime.⁷⁵

The only way to prepare the infantry soldier and his unit for combat is through quality training that is realistic and is focused on the wartime mission.⁷⁶ The Army applies the crawl-walk-run theory in developing training plans. First, individual training is conducted such as, basic rifle marksmanship, mastery of common tasks and physical fitness. Once individual soldier skills are developed, the infantry soldier trains collectively as part of a crew, team, squad, platoon and battalion. Collective training requires the disciplined development of tactics, techniques and procedures.⁷⁷ It is during collective training that individuals learn to fight as part of a combined arms team and where leaders learn to synchronize the elements of combat power. Combat skills, both individual and collective, are perishable over a short period of time. To remain combat ready requires units to remain focused on training and sustainment.

Peace Operations and Unit Readiness

The process of training and maintaining warfighting skills is outlined in Army Field Manual 25-101, *Training the Force*.⁷⁸ Army units traditionally experience cyclic readiness patterns.⁷⁹ After a major collective training event, usually a national training center rotation, a unit is considered trained and prepared for combat. The process of planning, and conducting training that enables a brigade size infantry unit to achieve combat-ready posture can take four to six months to achieve. Training may include platoon through battalion size maneuvers, live fire exercises, command post exercises, and simulations. Maintaining unit combat readiness consumes the energy of commanders at all levels and stretches the resources available. It is not uncommon for a unit to experience an immediate degradation of readiness at the conclusion of a training cycle. Many variables immediately surface that contribute to a unit's immediate degradation in readiness. At the conclusion of major training events, units usually experience significant personnel turbulence, where new soldiers are assigned and others depart. Units usually schedule block leave at the conclusion of long training cycles because the unit has endured an exhaustive schedule with little time off. In addition, once a unit completes its collective training cycle it usually falls into a support cycle (red cycle). Support cycles may include training support for another unit engaged in collective training or taskings to provide soldiers to perform tasks which are unrelated to training. For these reasons infantry units struggle to remain combat ready, regardless of operational deployments. Unforeseen operational deployments to conduct peace operations only compound the problem.

A recent study conducted in 1996 measured the effects of peace operations on unit readiness.⁸⁰ The study recognized that units should prepare and execute training plans

prior to conducting peace operations. The study noted that units that are well trained, disciplined, and led can deploy to peace operations and be successful. However, units deploying on peace operations require from four to six months after returning from home station to return to normal levels of readiness.⁸¹ Infantry, armor, mechanized, combat support and combat service support all have different requirements when returning from peace operations deployments. The study noted, however, that all units go through common phases when returning to normal combat readiness.⁸² The Phases are listed in Table Two below:

Table Two: Common Phases (Return to Readiness)

Phase	Time Required
Initial Recovery	1-2 Weeks
Block Leave	2 Weeks
Maintenance	30 Days (Light Infantry)
Personnel Restructuring	3 Months
Individual Training	4-6 Weeks
Collective Training	8-10 Weeks
Transportation of Equipment	1-2 Months

Note: Time periods vary depending on type of unit, size and other variables

Summary:

The purpose of the literature review was to formulate a hypothesis and derive a methodology in which to answer the research question: **should light infantry forces include peace operations in the development of their mission essential task list?** The literature review identified the differences in principles that apply to war and operations other than war. It was found that the principles applying to operations other than war,

such as, perseverance and restraint are distinct and unique. The review also highlighted tasks associated with conducting combat operations and operations other than war. The review revealed that tasks associated with peace operations were also distinct and unique from those of combat related tasks. The review found that combat readiness requires training that is disciplined, realistic and focused on the wartime mission. It also found that peace operations erode the combat readiness of infantry forces and a period of four to six months is required to return to normal levels of combat readiness.

From this review a hypothesis may be formulated, and a methodology for analysis developed. Given the scope, orientation, principle differences between war and operations other than war, and the erosion of combat readiness that occurs, it would seem that peace operations should be included as a mission essential task of infantry forces.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology applied to answer the research question is an historical analysis. Three recent peace operations (Provide Comfort, Uphold Democracy and Restore Hope) are briefly examined to identify the major tasks that were performed to accomplish the peace mission. The tasks are then examined to determine if they are unique to peace operations or align with tactical tasks associated with combat operations. The classification will be conducted directly from the lists provided in the previous chapter (tactical tasks, tasks associated with peace operations). This methodology will enable an assessment that measures the extent tasks associated with peace operations differ from combat operations. The measurement determines the proportionate numbers of tactical and non-combat related tasks that were performed during these operations. The reasoning

behind the methodology is to determine if operations, which deviate to a large extent from combat operations, need independent training focus during peacetime.

Operations were selected on the basis of light infantry involvement and convenience. In addition, light infantry forces are usually the basis of early entry forces and can operate in urban and other restrictive terrain. They are well suited for peace operations and are organized for accomplishing tasks such as securing and operating checkpoints and roadblocks.⁸³ Light infantry is often called on to perform peace operations and adequate historical data is available for analysis.

PEACE OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

Operation Provide Comfort

In March of 1991 the Kurds in northern Iraq, after the defeat of the Iraqi Army in Desert Storm, rebelled against a weakened Saddam Hussein. The Kurdish rebellion, which was encouraged by American radio broadcasts, was ruthlessly thwarted by remnants of the remaining divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard.⁸⁴ As the republican guard suppressed the Kurdish rebellion with superior firepower from mechanized vehicles and helicopter gun-ships the Kurds fled in mass numbers from Iraq. By the end of the first week in April 800,000 Kurds had fled to Iran, 300,000 to southeastern Turkey and another 100,000 to the Iraq-Turkish border.⁸⁵ The mortal threat to the fleeing Kurds was grave. The Kurds were vulnerable to Iraqi snatching runs as they moved along trails into the mountain passes of northern Iraq. They also suffered from the elements, lack of food, shelter, water, and medical support. It became evident that a humanitarian emergency was under way and on 16 April "President Bush, in conjunction with European allies announced the

establishment of a security zone in northern Iraq.”⁸⁶ As a result, a Combined Task Force (CTF) was stood up which became known as operation Provide Comfort.

Operation Provide Comfort was a unique operation bringing together the forces of 13 nations and material contributions from over 30 nations.⁸⁷ Although Provide comfort was deemed a humanitarian relief operation the situation called for security of refugees in a harsh environment. The US Army infantry force designated to support CTF-B was the 3rd Battalion of the 325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team. Alerted on short notice, the battalion had about one week (seven days) between the warning order to move and the movement order.⁸⁸ The battalion conducted a quick analysis of the training and equipment requirements and put together a training plan to ensure soldiers were prepared to conduct the following: establish a security zone, establish observation posts, check point operations, search techniques for personnel and vehicles, fortify check point positions, mine education, mine field marking, tactical movement, navigation, movement to contact, relief in place, and prepare defensive positions.

The 3rd battalion, 325th Airborne Combat Team arrived in Turkey on 27 April 1991. As part of Joint Task Force Bravo, it immediately began conducting operations to provide space between the Kurdish refugees and Iraqi military forces. During the analysis prior to deployment it was decided that mobility was needed for the entire combat team. This was accomplished by reconfiguring organic lift assets prior to deployment. In addition, the combat team received navigational equipment (global positioning systems) prior to deployment. The combat team was assigned a sector in which it was responsible for patrolling and creating a security zone. It accomplished this by establishing check points and observations posts in sector. It relied on the threat of force to convince Iraqi

units to give ground as it established the security zone. It did this by establishing checkpoints and digging in anti-tank missiles in overwatch positions. The movement of forces within the buffer zone portrayed a force that was larger and more robust than it actually was. Operations within the security zone relied on initiative and decisions being made at the lowest levels. Squads encountering Iraqi forces made on the spot decisions such as whether to move, screen, establish a static site, or call for guidance. The operation was very fluid. The Combat team relied on graphics, navigation and checkpoints to establish the buffer zone. When possible, air support was incorporated into all actions. At times, refugee evacuation would occur simultaneously while maintaining the security zone. The 325th Combat Team continued operations until its redeployment in mid July. The mission was considered a complete success with minimal loss of life. Success of the operation is attributed to pre-deployment training the team conducted, its well-disciplined soldiers, and the leadership of the combat team.

Operation Restore Hope

United States involvement in Somalia proceeded through three phases: Operation Provide Relief, Operation Restore Hope, and UNOSOM II.⁸⁹ The focus of the overview for this monograph is on 10th Infantry Division's participation during Operation Restore Hope, which occurred for 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993.

The deployment of US Army forces to Somalia was a typical post-Cold War operation and signified a radical approach to peace enforcement operations.⁹⁰ For the 10th Mountain Division (LI) Operation Restore Hope Began on November 30 1992.⁹¹ It was designated the Army Force Headquarters (ARFOR) for the United Task Force Somalia

(UNITAF). The operation began with the deployment of 2nd Brigade 10th Infantry Division (LI) on 12 December 1992. The mission was to provide humanitarian relief to thousands of war-torn civilians caught between the conflict of warring clans. Somalia was a nation divided and torn by a civil war and all aspects of the economy and infrastructure were affected.⁹² Official statistics estimate that of the population of 5.1 million in Somalia, approximately four million lived in famine-afflicted regions. "Of the four million, 330,000 were at imminent risk of death."⁹³ As the soldiers of 10th Infantry began operations the picture on the ground began to take shape. Weapons were everywhere, and a real threat to all relief operations meant that force protection was an essential priority. It was difficult to distinguish threat or foe, and negotiations between government representatives, police, or anyone with authority was difficult.⁹⁴ As Major General Arnold explains: "neither a national government nor regional governments existed; only self-appointed local leaders bent, for the most part, on extortion and abuse of power... nonexistent were the police, justice system, schools, public water, public electricity, and transportation system."⁹⁵ This was the environment that existed as the 10th Infantry Division deployed to Somalia.

The mission of the 10th Infantry Division was to secure relief operations in assigned humanitarian relief sectors and break the cycle of starvation.⁹⁶ In many respects, however, Operation Restore Hope was very unique. "It may have been a first for US Army forces fulfilling peace enforcement and peacekeeping roles in support of a United Nations humanitarian mission."⁹⁷ The mission was very complex for several reasons. The planning team of the division lacked timely and accurate information about the warring clans, infrastructure, and the geography of the country. The lack of information in the

planning phase had a direct impact on decisions made prior to deployment.⁹⁸ More than 20 coalition countries and 49 different humanitarian agencies contributed to the operation.⁹⁹ Operations were joint, combined and political. Uncertainty was induced by the inability to distinguish between cooperative clans and other hostile factions.

Once deployed, the 10th Infantry Division was assigned humanitarian relief sectors and began operations. The tasks performed by the infantry battalions of the 2nd Brigade included: air assaults, cordon and searches, patrolling, tactical marches, weapons confiscations, operations on urbanized terrain, security operations, and navigation.¹⁰⁰ Operations were planned daily and ranged from brigade-size combat operations to squad-size patrols.¹⁰¹ Other tasks included: security of relief supplies, engagement of hostile and armed belligerents, checkpoint operations and troop leading procedures in preparation of operations. The commander of 10th Infantry, MG Steven Arnold, emphasized that tactical training on combat related tasks and current individual and collective training doctrine adequately prepared his unit for Operations Other Than War.

Operation Uphold Democracy

On 16 December 1990, Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide gained 67% of the Haitian vote and was democratically elected President of Haiti.¹⁰² The election was validated and upheld by the United Nations and Aristide took office on 7 February 1991. His presidency was short-lived. On 30 September 1991, President Aristide was overthrown in a coup d'etat led by LT General Raoul Cedras.¹⁰³ The coup was followed by widespread condemnation by the UN Security Council and immediate diplomatic measures were taken to restore the elected leader. Diplomatic efforts by the UN over the

next three years included embargoes, sanctions, diplomatic envoys and a host of resolutions aimed at restoring the elected government in Haiti. The government under Cedras was repressive and violations of basic civil rights began to take their toll on the people of Haiti. By June of 1994 the rape and murder of family members of political activist was increasing. The economy continued to spiral downwards and the efforts of humanitarian agencies in Haiti were having very little success. Haiti was poverty stricken, in the midst of civil disorder and the poorest country of the Americas.¹⁰⁴ As a result of these, and other growing concerns, President Clinton announced that diplomatic efforts had failed. The Clinton administration gathered the support of 20 other countries and announced that military actions would follow to reinstate the legitimate government of Haiti.¹⁰⁵

There were two plans developed by US Atlantic Command to invade Haiti and restore the democratically elected government. One option, (OPLAN 2370) called for the XVIII Airborne Corps to serve as JTF 180. In this option the 82nd Airborne Division would execute a forced entry invasion by seizing and securing key ports and airfields in Haiti.¹⁰⁶ The second option (OPLAN 2380) called for the 10th Mountain Division to serve as JTF 190 and execute a permissive entry landing in Haiti.¹⁰⁷ In an interesting deployment package, the 10th Mountain, (aviation brigade, two infantry battalions and the 1st Brigade headquarters) loaded on the aircraft carrier Eisenhower at Norfolk Virginia and sailed for Haiti. Both Task Forces planned and prepared for operations, but it wasn't determined until the last possible minute, which Task Force would actually land in Haiti. After last minute diplomatic efforts an accord was reached between former President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn with Cedras that enabled

permissive entry into Haiti. The mission was given to JTF 190 and on the morning of 19 September the first combat forces of the Army's 10th Mountain Division landed by helicopter at Port-au-Prince international airport.¹⁰⁸ With this landing, Operation Uphold Democracy was under way.

Operation Uphold Democracy was conducted in support of Security Council Resolution 940, which allowed for the "application of all necessary means" to bring Democracy to Haiti.¹⁰⁹ On 11 September 1994 the 10th Mountain Division began deployment to Haiti with the mission of "ensuring Haitian armed forces and police comply with the Carter-Cedras accords."¹¹⁰ The 10th Mountain Division had trained and prepared to use military force to restore Democracy to Haiti. The permissive entry scenario under the guidance of an accord was not anticipated. As LTG H. Hugh Shelton, commander of JTF 190 stated, "...never in my wildest imagination did I think I would be coming here with the mission of cooperating and coordinating in an atmosphere of mutual respect."¹¹¹ The mission basically changed in-route. This meant that orders had to be altered and the orientation on the methodology of operations changed. The change in posture "clouded the soldiers' sense of purpose and baffled the Haitian populace as well."¹¹²

The 10th Mountain Division, relying on its experience in Somalia, put together an extensive training plan to prepare for operations in Haiti. The Division training plan "covered the full spectrum of possible scenarios."¹¹³ In just 15 training days the 1st Brigade conducted multiple exercises and situational training excersises that included individual, leader and collective level training. Training included: air assaults, live fire exercises, civil disturbances, command posts exercises, company and battalion maneuver exercises. Training was conducted during day and night. Battlefield conditions were

emulated with the inclusion of civilians, media and armed guards etc. This training prepared the division for many of the tasks that were actually performed during operations in Haiti.

The maneuver forces of 10th Mountain Division in Haiti conducted mostly tactical type operations; patrols, cordon and search, convoy protection, establish observation posts, controlling access of facilities, manage movement of population, defense of a fixed site, route reconnaissance, hasty road block and confiscation of weapons.¹¹⁴

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to classify tasks actually performed during three recent peace operations to determine the extent they delineate from tasks associated with wartime missions. Each task outlined below is classified as either a tactical task or a peace operations task in Table Three Below. This analysis will provide insight into the nature of peace operations. More specifically, this analysis will enable an assessment to determine if training focus of infantry forces needs to include tasks associated with conducting peace operations.

Operation Provide Comfort was a European Command operation, which organized as a Combined Task Force consisting of: CTF Alpha, Bravo, CSC, Civil Affairs, AFFOR, Navy, and relief agencies. The 3rd Battalion, 325th Airborne Combat Team was organized under the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit as part of CTF Bravo. The Battalion Combat Team was assigned the mission of establishing a buffer zone between Iraqi forces and the fleeing Kurds. The major tasks associated with operation included: establish an observation post, mark minefields, establish defensive positions, call for fire, direct air

support, establish sectors of fire, evacuate refugees, move tactically, deploy, sustain combat operations, conduct route reconnaissance, troop leading procedures, protect the force.

Operation Restore Hope was a UN mission aimed at protecting humanitarian relief organizations as they reduced the widespread suffering in Somalia. The 10th Mountain division served as the ARFOR headquarters and provided an infantry brigade in support of the operation. The tasks performed by the infantry battalions of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain division included: air assaults, cordon and searches, patrolling, tactical marches, weapons confiscations, operations on urbanized terrain, security operations, defense of a fixed site, route reconnaissance and navigation.¹¹⁵ Operations were planned daily and ranged from brigade-size combat operations to squad-size patrols.¹¹⁶ Other tasks included: security of relief supplies, engagement of hostile and armed belligerents, checkpoint operations and troop leading procedures in preparation of operations.

The 10th Mountain division served as the primary ground maneuver force of JTF 190, which landed in Haiti on 19 September 1994. The mission of the TJF was to ensure the Haitian armed forces and police complied with the Carter-Cedra Accords. The maneuver forces of 10th Mountain Division in Haiti conducted mostly tactical type operations; patrols, cordon and search, convoy protection, establish observation posts, controlling access of facilities, manage movement of population, defense of a fixed site, route reconnaissance, hasty road block and confiscation of weapons.

Table Three, below, compiles the tasks that were actually performed by the ground infantry forces during three recent peace operations. The table illustrates which of these tasks are tactical tasks and which are specifically associated with peace operations.

Table Three: Peace Operations Tasks Actually Performed

Operation	Task	Classification
Provide Comfort	Establish observation posts	Tactical
	Mark minefields	Tactical
	Establish defensive positions	Tactical
	Employ Indirect Fires	Tactical
	Employ air support	Tactical
	Establish a buffer zone	Peace Ops task
	Evacuate refugee's	Peace Ops task
	Tactical Movement	Tactical
	Deploy	Tactical
	Route, Area recon	Tactical
	Establish check point	Peace Ops task
	Convoy security	Tactical
Restore Hope	Air Assault	Tactical
	Cordon and Searches	Peace Ops task
	Patrolling	Tactical
	Tactical Marches	Tactical
	Weapons Confiscation	Peace Ops tasks
	Defense of a fixed site	Tactical
	Route Recon	Tactical
	Establish check point	Peace Ops task
	Convoy security	Tactical
Uphold Democracy	Patrolling	Tactical
	Cordon and search	Peace Ops task
	Convoy Protection	Tactical
	Establish Check point	Peace Ops task
	Establish Observation Posts	Tactical
	Control Facilities	Peace Ops task
	Manage movement of Population	Peace Ops task
	Defense of a fixed site	Tactical
	Route Recon	Tactical
	Hasty Road Block	Peace Ops task
	Confiscation of weapons	Peace Ops task

CONCLUSION

Findings

During Operation Provide Comfort most of the tasks performed by infantry forces were tactical tasks. Although not all tasks listed would be considered a unit's mission essential task, most of them would serve as battle tasks regardless of the operation being conducted. Of the 11 tasks listed eight were tactical tasks and three were associated more specifically with peace operations.

The tasks conducted by infantry forces during operation Restore Hope reflect a higher reliance on tactical tasks. Of the nine tasks identified, six were tactical and three could be associated specifically with peace operations.

The tasks conducted by infantry forces during operation Uphold Democracy reflect a higher degree of activities associated specifically with peace operations. Of the eleven tasks classified, six were associated specifically with peace operation and five were classified as tactical tasks. The nature of restoring democracy in Haiti, in accordance with an accord, may have shifted the requirement to tasks more associated with peace operations.

Conclusion

The findings of this monograph suggest that infantry forces deploying to conduct peace operations rely to a greater extent on tactical competency than on tasks specifically associated with peace operations. This evidence suggests that infantry forces should not include tasks specifically focused on peace operations in the development of their mission

essential tasks lists. Based on the findings of this monograph, infantry forces that remain battle focused and trained to accomplish their wartime mission would be capable to transition quickly and accomplish most of the tasks associated with peace operations.

Army Doctrine and many senior Army leaders echo the findings of this monograph. Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie, in his comments regarding operation Task Force Eagle, stated that "conventional forces are the right forces for peace operations missions."¹¹⁷ In the "Initial Impressions" assessment produced by the Center for Army Lessons Learned on operations in Haiti it was noted that: Training units for war produced units fully capable of conducting operations other than war... Operation Uphold Democracy demonstrated that units that conduct hard, realistic training for war produce the disciplined soldiers who will have the versatility to conduct OOTW."¹¹⁸ The belief that soldiers who are trained to perform combat operations are also prepared for peace operations is also stated by MG Steven L. Arnold after his unit conducted operations in Somalia: "Well-trained, combat-ready, disciplined soldiers can easily adapt quickly and easily to Somalia-type situations... versatile units with flexible leaders are able to adjust to the complexities faced in operations other than war."¹¹⁹

This monograph concludes infantry units trained in mission essential tasks, that are oriented on the wartime mission, are to a large extent trained to conduct tasks associated with peace operations. There is notable concern that peace operations are difficult complex, and may erode the warrior ethos of our combat units. Clearly, as research has concluded, the combat readiness of combat forces are eroded when engaged in peace operations. As the Army continues to engage in peace operations, however, the focus should not change. Army infantry forces should continue to keep their training focus on

wartime contingencies. The consequence for adjusting the training focus would certainly be greater than adjusting to peace operations. Disciplined, well-trained and led infantry forces can adapt to a wide variety of missions. Infantry units that fail to remain battle focused would be hard pressed to adapt to a combat situation if their training focus included peace operations.

This monograph was successful in answering the research question: **should light infantry forces include peace operations in the development of their mission essential task list?** It began by discussing concerns that currently exist in regards to increased employment of combat units in peace operations missions. From there a review of army doctrine enabled a formulation of a hypothesis and the development of the methodology to answer the research question. An historical overview of three recent peace operations enabled tasks to be examined and classified to determine the extent tasks associated with peace operations deviated from combat operations. This analysis found that tasks associated with conducting peace operations, for the most part, are tactical tasks that would be included in infantry forces existing lists of battle tasks. In light of this finding it was concluded that infantry forces should not include peace operations in the development of their mission essential tasks list.

ENDNOTES

1. Douglas Scalard, "People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough," Military Review, Vol. LXXVII, July-Aug 1997. 4. The author cites the US national military strategy of engagement and enlargement, "The United States recognizes that we have a special responsibility that goes along with being a great power."
2. Reimer, 110.
3. Dennis J. Reimer, "Challenge and Change: A Legacy for the Future," Military Review, Vol. LXXVII, 4, July-August 1997. 111.
4. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, Third edition, United Nations Publishing, 1996. 3.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. 4. The Blue Helmets explains the reason for much of this increase. In 1992, the Security Council met for the first time at the level of heads of State or Government to consider the new opportunities for international peace and security. Discussions included the framework and provisions of the Charter for the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and peace-keeping.
7. Army Field Manual 100-23, "Peace Operations," Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994. v.
8. Tim Zimmerman, "A Legacy of American Intervention," U.S. News and World Report, December 1995. 46.
9. Army Field Manual FM 23-100, Peace Operations. V.
10. Pat Towell, "Pentagon Seeks Money to Pay for Unscheduled Missions," Defense and Foreign Policy, January 1995. 216.
11. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Department of Defense, Washington, DC: September 1997. 6. The NMS states that throughout our history the armed forces have responded to a variety of needs other than wars. It recognizes that needs arise that exceed the capabilities of other agencies and require the use of military forces.
12. Richard J. Rinaldo, "Warfighting and Peace Operations: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW," Joint Forces Quarterly, winter 1996. 115. The Article compares principles of OOTW with the principles of war. The author argues that soldiers are capable, and should

be considered as viable in conducting operations other than war. He argues that peace and war are interrelated and inform one another.

13. John M. Shalikashvili, "Humanitarian Missions Challenge Military and the Media," Defense Issues, Vol. 0, 54, May 1995. 1.

14. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping. 299.

15. Ibid. 300.

16. Lawrence A. Yates, "Military Stability and Support Operations," Military Review, Vol. LXXVII, 4, July-August 1997. 51. The Author emphasizes the difficulty of military officers in planning and executing operations other than war. The environment and non-traditional warfighting roles associated with these operations leaves officers "adrift."

17. Ibid.

18. Richard J. Rinaldo, "War Fighting and Peace Operations: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW." 113.

19. Puline H Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, spring 1996. 19. The author's site that failed states are becoming more common and that "teacup wars" are the core problem of post-Cold War politics. The authors also site that since the termination of Desert Storm the US military conducted 27 overseas operations stemming from ethnic wars or state collapse, ranging in scale from noncombat evacuation in Sierra Leone to Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti.

20. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 6.

21. Ralph C. Kent, Anatomy of Disaster Relief: The International Network In Action, (London: Printer, 1987). 1-12.

22. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 6.

23. Army Field Manual, 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993. 13-0.

24. Army Field Manual 25-100, Training The Force, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1988. I.

25. Ibid. 2-4.

26. Ibid. 2-9.

27. Ibid. 1-4. The principle of training are: Train as a combined arms team, train as you fight, use appropriate doctrine, use performance oriented training, train to challenge, train to sustain proficiency, train using multiechelon techniques, train to maintain, and make commanders the primary trainers.
28. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 5.
29. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. 13-0.
30. Sean D. Naylor, "Generals Lash Out Over Army Share of Money," Army Times, February, 1998. 3.
31. FM 23-100, Peace Operations. 4.
32. Ibid. V.
33. Lawrence Yates, "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes." 56.
34. FM 100-23, Peace Operations. 86.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. 87.
37. Douglas Scalard, "People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough." 5.
38. Lawrence Yates, "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes." 56.
39. Richard J. Newman, "Can Peacekeepers Make War," US News and World Report, Vol. 124, No 2, January 1998. 39. This article highlights the effects of lower budgets, downsizing and increased operations tempo on military combat readiness. As of the time of this writing several articles have appeared in various sources raising concerns over the readiness of the US military to fight and win the nation's wars.
40. Ibid.
41. Ernest Blazar, "Inside the Ring: Ground Truth," Washington Times, February 1998. 8.
42. Sean D. Naylor, "Generals Lash Out Over Army Share of Money," Army Times, February, 1998. 3. Gen. Sullivan sites that there are several indicators that contribute to

his assessment. Recent reports of substandard readiness and preparedness of Army units completing rotations at the nation's training centers, and infantry shortages in units.

43. Ibid.

44. Tom Clancy with Frederick Franks, Into the Storm: A Study In Command, New York: Putnam, 1997. 92-96.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995). 21.

48. Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire. 18.

49. Ibid. 33.

50. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 11.

51. Shalikashvili, 1.

52. Paul H. Hubert, "Deciding What has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations," Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS: July 1988. The current definition, which is found in the current 1993 version of FM 100-5, states: "Doctrine is the statement of how America's Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other than war. It is a condensed expression of the Army's fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events in operations other than war, and deterring actions detrimental to national interest."

53. Army Field Manual, 100-5 Operations. v.

54. Ibid. 2-1.

55. Ibid. 2-5.

56. Army Field Manual 23-100, Peace Operations. 2.

57. Ibid. 7.

58. Ibid. 8.

59. Ibid. 2.

60. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, VA: June 1997. I-1
61. Ibid. 28.
62. Ibid. I-10.
63. Internet Source, "United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations," <http://ralph.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/toc.html>, Jan 1998.
64. Robert E. Bauman, "Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control," Military Review, Vol. LXXVII, July-Aug. 17.
65. FM 23-100, Peace Operations. 33.
66. Ibid. 38.
67. Ibid.
68. Douglas Scalard, 8.
69. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. XVI.
70. Army Field Manual 71-100, Division Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC: August 1996. 1-1.
71. Ibid. 1-7
72. Ibid.
73. Student Text, 100-3, Battle Book, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: June 1996. 1-8. The student text serves as a quick reference for planners. It is derived from the most current doctrinal literature available.
74. Ibid. 1-7. The remaining tactical tasks are: contain, delay, demonstrate, fix, interdict, isolate, neutralize, penetrate, pursue, recon, rupture, suppress, clear, occupy, secure, seize, breach, cover, disengage, displace, exfiltrate, follow and support, infiltrate, retire, screen, support by fire, and withdraw.
75. Army Field Manual 25-100, Training The Force. 2-4.

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77. Ibid. 86.
78. Army Field Manual 25-100, Training The Force,
79. Ibid. 1-5. The band of excellence illustrates the cyclic readiness pattern of Army units as they fluctuate in proficiency.
80. The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness, Special Study, Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth KS: February 1996. This Study was tasked by headquarters, ODSCOPS, to TRADOC. The study examined four recent peace operations: Operation Restore Hope, UNISOM II, MFO in Sinai, Operation Able Sentry, and Operation Uphold Democracy. The study measured the time units spent preparing for peace operations and the amount of time it took for units to return to their normal level of readiness.
81. Ibid. 10.
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83. "The Application of Peace Enforcement: Operations at Brigade and Battalion," A White Paper, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA: Aug 1994. 17.
84. Chris Seiple, The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, Peacekeeping institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, 1996. 21.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. After Action Report, USCINCEUR On Operation Provide Comfort, Headquarters, United States European Command, January 1992. 1.
88. John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," Military Review, Vol. LXXIII, 3, March 1993. 12. LTC John P. Abizaid was the battalion commander of 3-325 Inf during operation Provide Comfort. His article in Military Review provides a detailed account of his unit's pre deployment preparation, execution and transition to NGOs.
89. Kenneth Allard, "Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned." 12.

90. Samuel P. Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old Roles," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993. 37.
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92. Ibid. 19.
93. Chris Seiple, "The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions." 98.
94. Steven L. Arnold, US Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division After Action Report. 19. The commander of 10th ID stated that: " factional fighting, constant threats to coalition forces and the proliferation of weapons throughout Somalia all made operations dangerous for soldiers. Bandits prevented relief supplies from getting to those who needed food, although the starvation was not as widespread as was expected prior to deployment."
95. Steven L. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," Military Review, Vol. LXXIII, No. 12, December 1993. 26.
96. Ibid. 27.
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98. Ibid. 5.
99. Steven L. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War." 29. The Author also explains that: "complexity was increased by essential interaction with the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, and OFDA. These complexities were further multiplied by the extreme dangers that existed in Somalia... weapons from small arms and crew served were everywhere."
100. Ibid. 31.
101. Ibid. 32. See also: "US Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division After Action Report. 2.
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